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Abstract. The contemporary versions of the ontological argument that originated 
from Charles Hartshorne are formalized proofs (in the metalogical sense of the 
word) based on unique modal theories. The simplest well-known theory of 
this kind arises from the b system of modal logic by adding two extra-logical 
axioms: (AA) “If the perfect being exists, then it necessarily exists” (Anselm’s 
Axiom) and (Al) “It is possible that the perfect being exists” (leibniz’s Axiom). 
In the paper a similar argument is presented, however none of the systems of 
modal logic is relevant to it. Its only premises are the axiom (AA) and, instead 
of (Al), the new axiom (AN): “If the perfect being doesn’t exist, it necessarily 
doesn’t”. The main goal of the work is to prove that (AN) is no more controversial 
than (AA) and – in consequence – the whole strength of  the modal ontological 
argument lies in the set of its extra-logical premises. In order to do that, three 
arguments are formulated: ontological, “cosmological” and metalogical.
1. Pursuant to the definition presented by boethius and Anselm, 
the perfect being (i.e. the greatest being or simply God) is something 
than which nothing greater can be thought. This definition is the key 
premise in the original argumentation of Anselm supporting the thesis 
about the existence of the perfect being.1 This is a popular summary of 
the argumentation: “Now that which is such that nothing greater can 
be conceived cannot exist only in the intellect. For indeed, to exist in 
reality is greater than to exist in the intellect only. If, then, that which is 
1 It is well known that both different versions of this argumentation and its criticism 
(started by Gaunilon) have had many centuries of tradition. This tradition will not be 
further discussed here.
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such that one can conceive nothing greater exists only in intellect, that 
than which is nothing greater can be conceived is that than is something 
greater can be conceived, which is contradictory. The being than which 
none greater can be conceived then necessarily exists both in the intellect 
and in reality.” (Gilson 1955: 133).
2. one of the assumptions of Anselm’s argumentation – expressed in the 
last sentence of the above mentioned citation – is a thesis according to 
which if the perfect being exists, it does so out of necessity; formally:
(AA) p0 → lp0,
where p0 is the propositional constant representing the sentence “The 
perfect being exists”. This premise seems not to be very controversial. It 
stems from the boethius-Anselm’s definition and an intuitive assumption 
that a non-contingent being is greater than a contingent being.
The so-called leibniz’s axiom says that the existence of the perfect 
being is possible:
(Al) mp0
leibniz was the first philosopher who considered this premise crucial in 
the ontological proof and analysed it in detail (including an argument 
attempt). The Al principle is not as obvious as the AA one, but it 
seems – at least at first sight – not to be very strong: in order to prove 
the possibility that a given being exists, it is enough to prove its cohesive 
theory (in this case – a cohesive theory of the perfect being; this issue 
will not be further discussed here).
3. I will now present a proof that is a possibly simpler version of the 
ontological argument in Hartshorn’s style. This version is formulated 
within the framework of the b system of the modal logic (a sub-system 
of the popular s5 system of the modal logic) supported by additional AA 
and Al axioms.
1. l(p0 → lp0) Gödel’s rule, AA,
2. mp0 → mlp0 1, modal logic: l(p → q) → (mp → mq),
3. mlp0 → p0 b system: mlp → p,
4. mp0 → p0  2, 3,
5. p0   4, Al.
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There are also more complex versions of the modal ontological argument 
(e.g. Alvin Plantinga’s) which involve an advanced ontology of possible 
worlds. These versions usually employ the s5 modal logic principle that 
is stronger than the b one. 
4. Irrespective of these differences, usually two sources of the surprising 
strength of the modal ontological argument are named: a) Al and b) b 
thesis used in step 3 or a stronger s5 thesis. It is supported by a fragment 
of the “ontological argument” entry presented in a popular philosophy 
dictionary: “This concession is much more dangerous than it looks, since 
in the modal logic involved, from possibly necessarily p, we can derive 
necessarily p.” (blackburn 1994: 269) 
A similar point of view was presented by John l. mackie, the 
author of a well-known work on the arguments for and against theism. 
According to him, Al only looks innocent, while this postulate, taking 
account of the specific s5 thesis (saying that everything that is possibly 
necessary is indeed necessary), is in fact a Trojan horse rather than an 
innocent, insignificant option. As said by mackie, a change in the basis 
for reasoning into a relevant system of the modal logic would not allow 
Plantinga’s argumentation to develop (mackie 1982). 
In the context of discussions focused on the modal ontological 
argument, such opinions emphasise the popularity of a conviction 
according to which certain specific principles of the modal logic are 
crucial premises of this argument and that adopting a weak system of this 
logic, e.g. T or s4 system, blocks the argument.2 Further considerations 
will prove that this conviction is faulty.
5. let’s call a thesis claiming that ‘if the perfect being does not exist, it 
does not exist out of necessity’ the axiom of the non-existence of the 
perfect being (in short: AN); formally:
(AN) ¬p0 → l¬p0
based on this premise, a very simple version of the modal ontological 
argument can be formulated. This can be done within any system of the 
modal logic supported by additional AN and Al axioms.
1. ¬l¬p0 → p0 AN, law of transposition,
2 Jerzy Perzanowski presents a similar point of view: “The ontological argument 
requires a legitimate and careful selection of the basic logic”. (Perzanowski 1994: 95)
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2. mp0 → p0  1, definition: mp ≡ ¬l¬p,
3. p0   2, Al.
Various formulations of the AN axiom were considered by Hartshorn 
(1965), Plantinga (1974) and malcolm (1960). For example Norman 
malcolm wrote: “What Anselm has proved is that the notion of 
contingent existence or of contingent nonexistence cannot have any 
application to God. His existence must either be logically necessary or 
logically impossible. [...] If God, a being a greater than which cannot 
be conceived, does not exist then He cannot come into existence. [...] 
since He cannot come into existence, if He does not exist His existence is 
impossible.” (malcolm 1960: 49)
In fact, it seems that AN is not more controversial than AA. It becomes 
even clearer after taking account of some theoretical contexts typical of 
such considerations: ontological, “cosmological” and metalogical.
6. The AA content can be expressed in the language of the ontology of 
possible worlds in the following way: if the perfect being exists in the actual 
world, it exists in every possible world. The AN content is the following: if 
the perfect being does not exist in the actual world, it does not exist in any 
possible world. both principles follow from a stronger postulate:
(P) The perfect being exists either in every possible world or in none of them.
If the perfect being existed only in some of the possible worlds, it would 
be a contingent being rather than the perfect one. Thus, the (P) principle 
seems to be an entirely natural explanation of intuitions included both in 
AA and AN. If so, AN is not more controversial than AA.
7. A similar conclusion can be reached taking account of an additional, 
“cosmological” assumption, according to which the perfect being is 
the only creator of the world. let’s assume a reality different than the 
one propagated by AA. Namely, the perfect being exists but it is not 
necessary. In consequence, the world has been created, although it did 
not have to be. This outcome does not seem to be logically contradictory, 
taking account of an intuition according to which the perfect being does 
not need any other being to exist.
let’s now assume that the reality contradicts the AN postulate, i.e. 
the perfect being does not exist, although it is possible. In consequence, 
the world was not created, although it could have been. This seems 
impossible: a world cannot be created if its potentially sole creator does 
183moDAl loGIC Vs. oNToloGICAl ArGumeNT
not exist. one way or another, taking the “cosmological” context into 
account in no way makes the AN postulate more controversial (easier to 
be refuted) than the AA one.
8. The aim of this point is to use metalogical tools to prove that 
the argument presented in point 5 is based on significantly weaker 
assumptions than the modal argument in Hartshorn’s style.
let Cn be a standard (classical) consequence operation defined on 
the power set of formulas of the propositional modal logic extended by 
the p0 form. let’s use the following indications:
TH = Cn(b ∪ {AA, Al}),
TN = Cn({Al, AN}).
Hence, TH is a theory created by extending the b system of propositional 
modal logic with the AA and Al axioms, while TN is a theory created 
by extending the system of the classical propositional logic with the Al 
and AN axioms.
meTATHeorem 1. AN ∈ TH
ProoF. based on the reasoning conducted in point 3, we know that the p0 
sentence is the TH thesis. This substitution of scotus’s law is also a TH thesis:
p0 → (¬p0 → l¬p0) ∈ TH.
So we obtain by Modus Ponens:
(¬p0 → l¬p0) ∈ TH. Q.e.D.
since Al and AN are TH theses, TN is a subset of TH. At the same time, 
TH is not identical to TN: Gödel’s rule and b-system axioms are not 
present in TN. In consequence, the TN theory is essentially weaker than 
the TH theory:
CoNClusIoN 1.  TN ⊊ TH.
meTATHeorem 2. p0 ∈ TN.
ProoF. The proof is very similar to the argument presented in point 5. Q.e.D.
CoNClusIoN 2. The sentence “The perfect being exists” is a thesis of 
the modal theory which: a) is a part of a theory which is the standard 
basis for the modal ontological argument and b) does not contain any 
specific principles of the modal logic.
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9. Therefore, it has turned out that specific theses of the modal logic – 
i.e. b or s5 – are not essential in the modal version of the ontological 
argument. In other words, the whole strength of the modal ontological 
argument lies in its premises rather than in its logical principles. This 
outcome undermines a quite popular conviction according to which 
such principles are indispensable.
Taking account of the persuasive strength of the AA and AN 
assumptions and (indicated in point 4) interpretations in which it 
is leibniz’s axiom (and specific principles of some of the modal logic 
systems) to be treated as the Trojan horse of the ontological argument, 
a question arises whether the main source of strength of this argument 
indeed comes down to this axiom.
According to leibniz, the basis for the modal ontological argument 
is the conditional thesis saying that if the perfect being is possible, it 
exists (line 2 in the proof presented in point 5). Taking account of the 
fact that it was deduced from the obvious law of the classical logic (law of 
transposition) and from the definition of the possibility operator, it could 
be adopted instead of AN as a premise of this argument. similarly to AA 
and AN, it has a character of a semantic postulate for the notion “perfect 
being”. Together with leibniz’s Axiom it creates a specific TN’ theory 
built of two axioms:
TN’ = Cn({mp0 → p0, mp0}).
(This theory is equivalent of TN on the basis of a standard definition 
of the operator m.) using these axioms to generate the thesis on the 
existence of the perfect being is the most trivial deduction of all. This, 
however, is under one condition. Namely, both premises, i.e. the whole 
theory, need to be accepted jointly.
The final diagnosis of the source of the quite surprising strength of 
the modal ontological argument is the following. No specific laws of 
the modal logic can constitute this source. In other words, selecting the 
modal logic does not matter in the argument construction. This source 
is not leibniz’s axiom (Al) or Anselm’s principle (AA) or the condition 
for the non-existence of the perfect being (AN) either – if every of these 
postulates is taken into consideration separately. The Trojan horse for 
this argument is leibniz’s theory of perfection, TN’.
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